
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DCI

DCI's MEETING WITH PFIAB
12 May 1982

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The briefings and papers piled on you must give you the feeling of being pumped up and stuffed with information.

I-look forward to a dialogue today. Start out by saying a little about how the system works, how things are used, how you can help us improve its focus and use.

- -- Intelligence not espionage, or collecting signals and electronic impulses or photographs, or code breaking -- rather it's identifying the questions that need to be answered, what information that takes, knowing how to get it, how to put it together, what to make out of it and how to relate it to policy.
- -- That takes form and is reflected in the national estimates. I see determining what estimates will be needed, their scope and timing and making them relevant to policy needs as the key task of a DCI.
- -- You can help by examining the program of national estimates and advising on its direction. If you compare the 28 estimates produced in 1981 and the 33 completed and now sheeduled for 1982 with the average of 12 a year completed during each of the years from 1976 through 1980, you will quickly see a quantum leap forward, not only in number, but their scope and breadth, in breaking new ground, in timeliness and relevance.
- -- These estimates steer the analytical effort, focus as well as serve the policy process, give focus to the current intelligence production, task the collection capabilities and establish the needs and direction for the rebuilding and improving of the system.

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-- All of these tasks have to be pushed and overseen. Intelligence and related capabilities need to be used to help implement and influence our policies and more and more frequently, that of our friends.

Later on I'll give you illustrations of how the threats get addressed and how the intelligence is put to work to implement policy.

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Let me first tell you how this is directed. As you know, Admiral Inman had years of experience working in the intelligence community in the budget process, in directing technical collection capabilities and in dealing with Congress. When I brought him in. told him I would like to concentrate on the analytical process, on relating that to policy and directing the Clandestine Service and special activities, and on working with the liaison services and other governments. He would handle the budget, the Community, the technical and scientific matters and the Congress. This worked will. We kept each other informed by quick meetings every day and a scheduled half-hour to go over everything on the docket. We had weekly meetings jointly with the DDI and the Chairman of the NIC, with the DDO and his Deputy and jointly with the DS&T and the Director of the Community Staff.

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The daily current intelligence was brought to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Vice President. This would be done by two experienced briefers who would return to Langley and spend 15 minutes or a half-hour with me, advising me on their reactions and concerns and I would suggest or direct additional storage for subsequent issues of the PDB and special work on the basis of this intelligence they brought back from their briefings of the intelligence makers.

We had weekly breakfasts with Haig and Weinberger. I attend an NSC or a Cabinet meeting probably on the average of 2 or 3 times a week. To discuss or report a matter with the President, I see him privately, either by appointment or quickly before a Cabinet or NSC meeting.

John and I will work together pretty much the same way. He has run both the Clandestine Service and the analytical apparatus, so he is likely to have more input into that. I will try to put in a little more time on the Hill; although I brief the Hill on most sensitive activities, I expect John will carry the bulk of the burden on testimony. John and I will devote more attention to S&T, which Bobby Inman never got around to much, and which needs attention. He will join in the weekly breakfast meetings with Haig and Weinberger. We will be in daily contact and will keep each other informed on a daily basis.

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Let me quickly run through the range of challenges we face and what intelligence is doing to sharpen and guide our approach to that.

- -- Nuclear missiles aimed at us.
- -- An estimate last summer addressed to the ability of the

  Soviets to respond to the choices for strategic forces improvement which the

  NSC had under consideration. It laid bare the present inability to protect

  land based missiles against the number and position of Soviet missiles it

  pointed up Soviet work on missile defense and its potential value and inability

  to protect against cruise missiles through the 90's it resulted in cutback of

  a number of MX missiles and the advantage of forcing Soviet expenditure on defense

  by penetrating bomber and guided missiles.
- -- In March we completed an annual estimate on Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict. It's a picture of how the Soviets train their leaders and forces to fight a nuclear war which has been gretted as an important new input to shaping US strategy and plans. It brought out their uncertainties and worries about the reliability of weapons and whether any plans for their use would work as planned and the importance of enhancing and magnifying these uncertainties. Also, it brought out their ability to quickly deploy missile defense and new systems being brought on stream, new more capable air defenses being developed. It also brought out strenuous efforts with extensive hardening, redundancy and mobility to protect their forces and their efforts on destroying their own command and control. This is a vital subject and will take an hour or two of adequate briefing.

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-- The Warsaw Pact land, sea and air forces substantially outnumber ours three or four to one eroding the quality previously held by NATO forces. This may be mitigated by reduced reliability of Polish, Rumanian, Hungarian and other Eastern European troops and recent evaluation of the state of low readiness of the Warsaw Pact Forces and the prospect of more warning preparation time than had been previously been estimated. This again is something which

was briefed to the full Senate a week or so ago and could well take an hour's

briefing on Jr

-- The thrust to the south. The 22 division in the Transcaucasus and Turkoman on the southern border of Iran have run command post exercises projecting the ability to reach the oil fields and the Gulf in ten days or two weeks. Those forces would have to move 800 miles through the narrow passes and high peaks of the Zagros Mountains and would have a fighting population at their back. This is a very substantial deterrent. The thrust into Afghanistan, if consolidated, would put Soviet forces in the southwest corner of Afghanistan where it meets the Iranian and Pakistan borders within 300 miles of flat tent country of the oil fields on the Gulf of Hormuz. It would also threaten Pakistan in particular and Baluchistan which would put them on the Indian Ocean. This force is being trained in Pakistan and Baluchistan, brough to Kabul, sent to Libyan training camps and then infiltrated back into Pakistan. This ominous prospect is presently blunted by the heroic Afghan Freedom Fighters. With a minimum involvement of leaders, trainers and arms 100,000 Soviet troops are kept tied up and battered. We estimate that it would take 400,000 troops, about one-third of the Soviet land forces to establish full control of Afghanistan. We have to worry about the Soviet ability to project power far from their borders as demonstrated in hooking up Soviet weapons and air transport with Cuban troops in Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen.

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Another level of threat is in the exploitation of indigenous religious and political and other regional tensions - the Shia and Sunni Moslem tensions running through Iran, Iraq, Syria and other states on the Persian Gulf - between Arabs and Jews - between moderate and radical Arabs - between blacks and whites in Africa. The Russians and Cubans are poised to exploit tension between Gringos and Latinos in this hemisphere if the Falklands and other latent territorial disputes get out of hand. Right now the most explosive is the danger that Iran will keep going into Iraq, take Basra, overthrow Sudan and put a Shiite ruler in Baghdad and inflame the Gulf and Middle East. This has the moderate Arabs frightened to death. Our post-Sinai policy is now being worked on and we will provide estimates on Lebanon, on the core positions in Palestine and on doing a quick estimate on the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and the interplay between the West Bank, the Syrian-Libyan-Iran axis and the modern Arab towards the attitudes of the Gulf and Iraq.

The defensive posture of the Argentines and the growing dimensions of Britains' logistical problems increases the danger of Soviet involvement in supplying weapons to the Argentines and opportunity for a Havana/Buenos Aires axis fomenting anti-American feeling throughout the hemisphere. We have done a quick estimate on the Falkland Islands crisis and are updating our earlier estimates on Cuban and Soviet activities in South America.

What we consider the most likely level of threat to be fully realized is that of surreptitious expansion or creeping imperialism. If you look at the 1982 map of the world the nations under some degree of Soviet influence, you will see that close to 50 nations are in red. The 1972 map shows that ten years ago, only 25 nations would have been colored in red. In the ten years between


1972 and 1982, 4 nations have extricated themselves from Soviet grasp and 23 nations have fallen under a significantly increased degree of Soviet influence or insurgency supported by the Soviets or their proxies. It is, in my opinion, no coincidence that today the 11 insurgencies under way throughout the world supported by Russia, Cuba, Libya and South Yemen happen to be close to the natural resources and the choke points in the world's sea lanes on which the United States and its allies must rely to fuel and supply their economic life. These threats have been developed in estimates on Central America, the Yemens, Morocco, the Horn of Africa, the Libyan-Ethiopian-South Yemen Pact, the Shaba, and on Soviet-US competition for the Third World influence.

On this threat intelligence can spot the conditions which create vulnerability and diagnose and help develop the capabilities needed to meet them. Subverison and insurgency exploit instability. We have established a Center for the Study of Insurgency and Instability which uses a wide range of techniques and methodologies to provide advance warning of instability and potential for destabilization in order to protect us from being caught by surprise as we were in Iran. The small and weak countries in which insurgencies can be fostered and developed to overthrow governments do not need and cannot handle expensive and sophisticated weapons for which virtually all of them clamor. What they need is light arms to defend themselves against externally trained and supported guerrillas, good intelligence, good police methods, good communications, training in small arms and their use in small unit actions, mobility to keep up with the hit-and-run tactics of guerrilla forces.

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So this is by way of illustration of the use of intelligence capabilities to implement policy.



# OUTLINE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY DIRECTIVE 2/82 STUDY

National Security Study Directive 2/82 is intended to result in a comprehensive analysis of the countermeasures capability of the United States to meet the total hostile intelligence threat. (S)

This will be accomplished in a detailed examination of each hostile intelligence discipline to include:

### **HUMAN SOURCES**

(FBI, CIA/DDO/DoD) (FBI, CIA/DDO & DDI, (DoD/DIA, NSA)	- Espionage - Technology transfer	- Legal and Illegal - Clandestine
		•

#### SIGINT

(NSA, CIA/DDI, DOD/	- Ships - AGIs Signal ships - 50 founds
DIA, Navy)	- Merchant Ships - Submarines - Aircraft Standoff
AF)	- Civil Overflights
	Legal establishments - External fixed sites
(NSA, DoD, FBI)	- Land bridges

#### **IMAGERY**

(NSA,	CIA,	נעסע		<b>-</b>	Satellite	es			<i></i>		
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CIA, DoD)	- Ships
(CIA, DoD)	- Aircraft
CIA, DoD)	- Sensors

(CIA, State) ACTIVE MEASURES

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Each of the listed hostile intelligence disciplines will be examined from four aspects.

#### (see p. 1)

#### 1. THREAT

- A summary evaluation of the threat broken down by each hostile country or appropriate groups of countries
- In CONUS
- Overseas
- Interrelationship of hostile countries

### (Study Director/ Staff)

#### 2. U.S. OBJECTIVES

### (FBI, CIA, DoD)

- U.S. CAPABILITIES -- Including aspects of (a) **3.** detection, collection and investigation, (b) analysis and assessment, and (c) countering
  - Description of the existing and programmed countermeasures of each agency involved in countering the specific hostile discipline
  - Coordination between agencies
  - Information/document, physical, personnel, communications, computer industrial security

to be included as annexes

#### (FBI, CIA, DoD)

#### DEFICIENCIES 4.

منقع العلوار ويعسرو بالماعات

- Perceived shortfalls
- Legal, procedural and resource-impacting policy limitations

Free vs\_closed society\_\_\_\_\_

- Projected 1985 to 1990 needs